INTRODUCTION
In November 2012, the journalists' advocacy organization, the Press Emblem Campaign (PEC), was awarded the Nicholas Bouvier Award for Journalism, for its work advocating for the protection of journalists and the adoption of an international treaty to protect journalists from acts of violence. one of the provisions of the draft covenant calls for the adoption of an internationally protected and recognized emblem, similar to the Red Cross emblem, as a means by which journalists can be identified as persons deserving special protection. 3 Journalists play an important role in civil society, especially in times of armed conflict -they are frequently the means by which vital information regarding the conflict is collected, recorded and disseminated to the world at large. 4 Unfortunately, 2012 was a particularly deadly year for journalists. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 70 journalists and two other media workers were killed in direct relation to their work in 2012, an increase of 42% on the same period in 2011. 5 Given such a record of violence against journalists, the idea of a new treaty that specifically relates to journalists seems a good idea. There is currently no 'stand-alone' treaty that relates to the status of journalists in times of armed conflict -the major armed conflict treaties, the Geneva Conventions However, it must be queried whether a new treaty would add anything of substance to the current law relating to the protection of journalists in armed conflicts. Under the law of armed conflict, journalists are classified as civilians and thus entitled to all the protections that attach to civilian status. In addition, certain kinds of journalists are entitled to classification as war correspondents, and are thus afforded prisoner of war (POW) protections if they are captured. Under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, there are comprehensive rules protecting these categories of persons. That acts of violence are committed against press workers in times of armed conflict is arguably due more to a lack of respect for the existing law, rather than an absence of relevant or meaningful law in the first instance. Indeed, it can be argued that some of the provisions in the draft press covenant, namely those on the proposed press emblem, could potentially cause, rather than prevent, harm to journalists.
In light of these developments, this article will examine the current legal protections that exist for journalists and analyze whether the introduction of a Press Convention and Emblem would actually serve or hinder attempts to provide better protection for journalists in situations of armed conflict. Part One of this article will analyze the current legal protections for journalists examining how the law protecting journalists has evolved in the laws of armed conflict. This section will also look at 8 See generally IDI Report, supra note 4. The Institute, at its eleventh meeting in Naples in 2009, specifically examined the question of the place of journalists in times of armed conflict. See Id. at 469-71. the perceived lacunae in the law protecting media personnel who operate in conflict zones. Part Two will examine the substance of the prototype convention for the protection of journalists, analyzing where the convention builds on the current law and where the convention diverges, or introduces new laws for journalists in conflict zones. Part Three will then examine whether such a convention is indeed necessary (and the extent to which it could increase risks to journalists and other citizens); specifically whether the Convention and the Press Emblem would actually help or hinder journalists in the field. The final section of this paper will look at a complication to the parameters of the debate on the protection of journalists -the 'fragmenting' of the concept of the journalist -in the wake of the emergence of so-called 'citizen journalism' and the rise in more varied forms of content creation that involve input from eyewitnesses, fixers, stringers, freelancers and local reporters. This section will explore whether these new categories of 'reporters' are fairly dealt with in the aims and objectives of both the existing law and the proposed Press Convention. This paper will argue that, despite the good intentions of organizations like PEC, efforts to introduce additional international law relating to the press in times of armed conflict are perhaps better directed towards educating the international community on the existing protections, and encouraging compliance with the laws of armed conflict as they currently stand.
I. JOURNALISTS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT -THE RATIONALE FOR SPECIAL PROTECTIONS
Journalists serve an important function in civil society. As noted by Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
Because of the power of information, news and journalism is a heavily contested domain. . . Journalists deserve special concern. . . because the social role they play is so important. . . an attack on a journalist represents an assault on the foundations of the human rights project and on informed society as a whole. Violence against a journalist is not only an attack on one particular victim, but on members of the society. Controlling the flow of information, especially during times of armed conflict and internal tensions, is of paramount importance to States, especially when public opinion is at stake. As noted by Cooke:
Civil liberties are rarely more endangered than in wartime, and none is more at risk than freedom of the press. The press is called on to rally patriotic fervor. It is expected to be the voice of the government and the voice of the people -the voice of the country at war. If instead it challenges the government, it is questions the rationale for war, it provokes the government's impulse, already strong in times of crisis, to repress liberties in the name of security.
13
This resistance to dissent from the media is evident with the most cursory of examinations of recent conflicts and internal tensions. In April of 2011, a number of journalists were captured and detained by governmental forces in Libya -this followed on from the detention and alleged abductions of four However, it is noteworthy that these journalists were reporting on issues or events that the governments in question attempting to conceal from public scrutiny. Indeed, a top secret 2001 UK Ministry of Defence 'Manual of Security' listed investigative journalists as a 'nontraditional threat' to security, including journalists in a category along with "criminal elements, disaffected staff, dishonest staff and computer hackers".
23
As Ungar notes ". . . that [the press] has traditionally been one of the first liberties to be denied by totalitarian governments demonstrates the significance and power of a free press". insufficient to protect its subjects. With this background in mind, the next section of this paper will examine the laws of armed conflict as they relate to journalists, to see whether this is indeed the case.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS PROTECTING JOURNALISTS
The idea that journalists would require some form of special recognition under the laws of armed conflict was recognized as far back as one of the first documents to regulate the conduct of parties engaged in armed conflict -the 1863 Lieber Code regulations drawn up on the international law of armed conflict for use by the Union Armies in the American Civil War.
32
Article 50 of the Lieber Code provided that "citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as such".
33
When the international laws of armed conflict were being debated in The Hague at the 1899 Peace Conferences, a similar provision regarding journalists was included in Article 13, 34 and it was reiterated in the 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Custom of War on Land, annexed to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Article 13 of the Regulations provides that "individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters" are entitled, in case of capture, to treatment on par with that extended to prisoners-of-war, on the condition that they are in possession of suitable accreditation -a certificate "from the military authorities of the army which they were accompanying. would enjoy certain benefits due to their connection to the armed forces.
37
When the Geneva Conventions were updated following the Second World War, the provision regarding war correspondents was retained and expanded. Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 4A provides that: 38 Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy. . .
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model. 39 Thus, embedded war correspondents captured while reporting on international conflicts would be afforded prisoner of war treatment -an expansion of the Hague protections and those of the 1929 Geneva Convention. 40 However, it should be noted that war correspondents, despite their inclusion in the Article 4A(4) section on POWs, are considered 'attached non-combatants' and as such are, fundamentally, civilians. 
38
See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6. 39 Id. at art. 4A(4) (emphasis added). 40 As defined in Dictionnaire de droit international public (Jean Salmon (dir), Brussels, 2001 at 275; translated from the French) a war correspondent is a 'specialized journalist who is present, with the authorization and under the protection of the armed forces of a belligerent, on the theatre of operations and whose mission is to provide information on events relating to the ongoing hostilities". 
42
Journalists in war zones on their own recognizance, and not authorised or accredited with an armed forces unit, receive no 'additional' special protection under the Conventions, in that they are not singled out for special mention. However, they are categorised as 'civilians'. As such, they are entitled to a raft of protections and rights regarding their treatment. Under the Protocol, journalists are entitled to obtain a government-issued identity card, attesting to his or her status as a journalist, identifying details of the news medium to which the journalist belongs, and the nationality or residence of the journalist. 49 However, it 42 AP Commentary, supra note 37, ¶ 3259. 43 See infra notes 48, 82 and accompanying text. 44 Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 79. 45 Id. at art. 75(1). 46 Id.
47
Id. at art. 75(2).. 48 Id. at art 75(3)-(8). 49 Id. at art. 79(3).; see also id. at Annex II (giving an example of the identity card)
is not necessary for journalists to be in possession of the card in order to be protected as a civilian. The word 'journalist' shall mean any correspondent, reporter, photographer, and their technical film, radio and television assistants who are ordinarily engaged in any of these activities as their principal occupation.
53
Article 79 does not create new law or a new status; it simply affirms that journalists are 'civilians', under the Conventions and Protocol I, and thus entitled to all the protections afforded to civilians. 54 Journalists will lose any special protection if they take direct part in hostilities, for as long as they take direct part.
55
What constitutes direct participation in hostilities has been debated for some time now. The idea is explicitly contained in Article 51 (3) The past few years has seen a number of endeavours at defining the parameters of direct participation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia looked at the question of direct participation in the case of Strugar; the Chamber defined direct participation as "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy's armed forces" 58 and elaborated on possible examples of direct participation as including:
bearing, using or taking up arms, taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or operations, armed fighting or combat, participating in attacks against enemy personnel, property or equipment, transmitting military information for the immediate use of a belligerent, transporting weapons in proximity to combat operations, and serving as guards, intelligence agents, lookouts, or observers on behalf of military forces. The Court also considered civilians involved in transporting ammunition to places for use in hostilities, as well as persons acting as voluntary human shields could be considered as taking direct part in hostilities. 63 The Court explained:
[the] direct character of the part taken should not be narrowed merely to the person committing the physical act of attack, those who have sent him, as well, take 'a direct part'. The same goes for the person who decided upon the act, and the person who planned it. It is not to be said about them that they are taking an indirect part in hostilities. 64 The Court went on, however, to exclude certain persons and acts from the scope of direct participation, including the selling of food and medicine to unlawful combatants; providing general strategic analysis, logistical and other general support, including monetary aid; and the distribution of propaganda. 65 Finally, the International Committee of the Red Cross undertook a comprehensive, though ultimately controversial study into direct participation. Their Interpretive Guidance defined direct participation as:
All persons who are not members of State armed forces or organised armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In non-international armed conflict, armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities ('continuous combat function').
66
The Interpretive Guidance states that, in order to qualify as direct participation:
A specific act must meet the following cumulative criteria: (1) the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations of military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or alternatively to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); (2) there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 62 Id. § 35. 63 Id. § § 35-36. 64 Id. § 37. integral part (direct causation); and (3) the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).
67
These elements are designed to ensure that persons who might supply subsidiary or tangential support -such as essentially administrative or support function -are excluded from being targeted, reserving targeting for the more serious levels of involvement.
With regards to journalists, participation does not include such activities as conducting interviews with civilians or combatants, taking still or moving pictures, making audio recordings or any other of the usual tasks involved in journalistic practice.
68
Even the dissemination of propaganda by a journalist does not amount to direct participation. Indeed, the ICTY noted this in its final report on the NATO This right to POW treatment is without prejudice to their fundamental status as civilians.
Non-embedded journalists are covered by all the protections extended to civilians.
80
As civilians, they are protected from the effects of the armed conflict, and are immune from being targeted or attacked, provided they take no active part in hostilities. 81 There is a raft of protections if they are interned in relation to the armed conflict, similar to the protections contained in the POW Convention.
82
Media equipment will also be considered to be civilian objects, and is therefore not to be made the object of attack. The laws that regulate non-international armed conflict are considerably more limited than those for international armed conflict.
73
Id. at art. 13. 74 Id.
75
Id. at arts. 15, 17, 29-33. 76 Id. at arts. 17-81. 77 Id. at arts. 70-77. 78 Id. at arts. 72-77. 79 Id. at arts. 82-108. 80 See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6; see generally also Additional Protocol, supra note 7 (regarding the protection of the civilian population during war).
81
Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at arts. 48-58. 82 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, at arts. 79-127; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 75. 83 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 52. 84 See GCIV, supra note 6, at art.146; Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 85. The relevant instruments that regulate non-international armed conflict are Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol II. These instruments provide some basic regulation of conduct in armed conflict, and lay down some basic fundamental protections for those most vulnerable in times of armed conflict -civilians, those detained in connection with the conflict, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.
In neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II are journalists or war correspondents specifically mentioned, they are thus afforded the same protections as civilians in non-international armed conflicts.
86
The relevant provisions for protections in non-international armed conflicts are contained in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: In this respect, the term 'civilian' is being used to describe all persons who are not members of the armed forces of the State, or of organized armed groups, or who otherwise take direct part in hostilities. Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 50.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. Any civilian interned in relation to the armed conflict is to be afforded protections with regards to the internment, in a similar (but limited) manner to those protections afforded to civilian internees in international armed conflicts. 99 Should civilians in non-international armed conflicts face penal prosecution in relation to the armed conflict, they are also to be afforded considerable legal protections, similar to those of civilian internees and POWs in international armed conflicts.
100
Civilians in noninternational armed conflicts should have access to relief societies and relief actions.
101
Given these broad protections, it would appear that journalists, as civilians and/or war correspondents, are comprehensively covered by the laws relating to armed conflict. However, the progenitors of the campaign for a press covenant seem to find the law lacking. This next section of the paper will examine the campaign and address its concerns and arguments. 87 Additional Protocol II, supra note 7, at arts. 13-17. 88 Id. at art. 4(2)(a). 89 Id.
90
Id.
91
92
Id. at art. 4(2)(c). 93 Id. at art. 4(2)(e). 94 Id. at art. 4(2)(d). 95 Id. at art. 4(2)(e). 96 Id. at art. 4(2)(f). 97 Id. at art. 4(2)(g). 98 Id. at art. 4(2)(b). 99 Id. at art. 5. 100 Id. at art. 6; see also EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND 
III. THE CAMPAIGN FOR A PRESS CONVENTION
The International Committee of the Red Cross has flagged the need to better protect journalists. At the 31 st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, held in 2011, the ICRC outlined its "Four Year Action Plan for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law". Objective 3, entitled "Enhanced protection of journalists and the role of the media with regard to international humanitarian law" , outlines the key objectives that the ICRC wishes to further in this regard, reaffirming that journalists are civilians and should be protected as such; that State armed forces IHL training include specific components on the protection of journalists; that States engage in IHL and security training for journalists; and that States enact adequate domestic legislation to prevent and sanction serious violations of IHL against civilians -including journalists.
102
No mention was included in the ICRC resolution of enhancing protection for journalists by adopting a new, specific treaty for the protection of journalists. Acceptance and ratification of such a convention has been the aim of a campaign for a new, specific treaty for the protection of journalists, including provision for a press emblem. 103 This campaign has been spearheaded by a number of non-governmental organizations, including the Press Emblem Campaign, 104 the Committee to Protect Journalists, 105 and Reporters Without Borders. 106 The campaign centers on the draft "International Covenant for the Protection of Journalists" current circumstances that have amplified the problem into a global problem with journalists killed in different regions of the world.
108
The draft covenant comprises twelve articles and reaffirms the protections afforded to journalists as civilians under international humanitarian law.
109
Opening with a twenty-six paragraph preamble, drawing heavily on international human rights law, the draft Covenant affirms the protections outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Journalists and media professionals have an essential role to play in order to testify and to make public the violations of human rights and humanitarian law, to denounce those who committed them and ensure the respect by all parties of the rights of civilians . . . [and] that the freedom of the press and the free exercise of journalism are essential to ensure the right of the public to information in all circumstances.
112

A. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DRAFT COVENANT
The scope of application of the covenant, outlined in Article 1, covers all times of "war and peace, during international armed conflicts. . . non-international armed conflicts. . . and in cases of serious internal violence, which includes local conflicts, civil unrest, targeted killings, kidnapping, authorized and unauthorized demonstrations." 113 The applicable scope of the Covenant would already seem to be broader than existing international humanitarian law. The lowest threshold for the applicability of IHL is Common Article 3, which is deemed apply in situations "not of an international character." The vagueness of the threshold was intentional; the idea being to ensure that any "open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree" 114 would fall within the scope of Common Article 3, but that any 108 Id. at Preamble. 109 internal disturbances and tensions, characterized by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed conflict in a legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or even to armed units for the purpose of restoring law and order. Within these limits, non-international armed conflict seems to be a situation in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a single State. 115 The key element for triggering the applicability of Common Article 3 seems to be the degree of organization of the armed forces; 116 this is reaffirmed in Protocol II, which includes the organizational element of the armed forces in its threshold of applicability. However, Protocol II is more restrictive in its applicability, including a territorial control element in its applicability threshold, stating that in order for the Protocol to apply, the conflict must:
Take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a party of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
117
The Protocol goes on to specifically exclude "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." Protocol II is thus considerably more restrictive in its scope of application than Common Article 3. The threshold for the application of the Press Covenant is thus noticeably broader that both Common Article 3 and Protocol II, as it includes serious violence in the context of riots and demonstrations. The Covenant is applicable to "all authorities representing a State as well as all representatives and so-called non-State actors of the civil society, such as criminal networks." Again, the Covenant seems to have a broader scope of applicability, in that is 115 Id. This definition of non-international armed conflict has been affirmed by the ICTY in the Tadic decision, where the Appeals Chamber stated that an "armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State." Prosecutor v. . . . all civilians who work as reporters, correspondents, photographers, cameramen, graphic artists, and their assistants in the fields of the print media, radio, film, television and the electronic media (Internet), who carry out their activities on a regular basis, full time or part time, whatever their nationality, gender and religion.
This definition is found in the preamble to the Covenant, rather than the Covenant proper.
C. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS
Article 2 of the draft Covenant reaffirms the statements of the preamble, prohibiting any "deliberate attack or aggression, threats, kidnapping or detention directed against a journalist while carrying out his or her functions", provided that the journalist does not directly contribute to the military operations. Article 2 reaffirms the IHL prohibition on targeting civilian installations and objects -in this case, media installations and equipment, and reaffirms that any "attack against the life and physical and moral integrity, notably killing, cruel and inhuman treatments, torture, hostage taking involving journalists" are prohibited at all times, and constitute a war crime.
118
This echoes the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which criminalizes violations of Common Article 3 as war crimes.
119
The Covenant also obliges journalists not to take any action which may adversely affect his or her status as a civilian, 120 must not be armed or contribute in any way to the hostilities, 121 and must not use their position 118 Draft Convention, supra note 107, at art. 2(3). 119 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(c)(i)-(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90. 120 Draft Convention; supra note 107, at art. 2(1). 121 Id. at art. 2(6).
as a media professional to incite "violence, genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of humanitarian law." 122 One curious contradiction in the Covenant is the provision that calls for journalists as defined under the covenant to be afforded POW status if captured.
123
While this is not an inherently problematic inclusion, echoing as it does the rights of embedded journalists in Geneva Convention III, it seems at odds with Article 2 of the Covenant, which prohibits detention of journalists -this will be discussed in more detail in the section below critiquing the Press Covenant.
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVENANT
The remainder of the Covenant covers issues such as assistance to be rendered to journalists by parties to the Covenant, and measures for the implementation and enforcement of the Covenant, such as undertaking inquiries into alleged violations of IHL and of the Covenant, the repression of breaches of IHL and the Covenant, training to be given to military personnel, and to and by journalism associations and media organizations and employers. Integral to the implementation and enforcement of the Covenant is the instrument's provision for the creation of an International Media Committee (IMC). Under Article 10, the IMC would serve to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the Covenant, and would comprise independent experts, from both media and other institutions of civil society, charged with collecting "all relevant information on the protection of journalists world-wide." States would thus have to report on their compliance with the Covenant to the IMC.
The Covenant also provides that the IMC is capable of hearing a request, submitted by an 'injured' journalist, his or her family and/or legal representative, for further consideration. If considered necessary, the IMC may establish an independent commission of enquiry, for the purposes of "establishing the facts and identifying the perpetrators." In this respect, the proposed IMC is similar to the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission, the permanent international body established under Article 90 of Additional Protocol I, "whose main purpose is to investigate allegations of grave breaches and serious Wisconsin International Law Journal violations of international humanitarian law."
124
Under the Protocol the IHFFC is tasked with the ability to "enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the Conventions and the Protocol or other serious violations of the Conventions or the Protocol" and "facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and the Protocol."
E. A PRESS EMBLEM
Along with the expanded scope of applicability and the protections for journalists as outlined in the Covenant, the new treaty proposes to also introduce an internationally protected emblem. Article 7 outlines the scope for a new emblem: 126 1. In order to strengthen the protection of journalists and facilitate their identification in zones of fighting, the States Parties decide to adopt a distinctive international emblem and commit themselves to respect it and ensure that it is respected in all circumstances.
2. This international distinctive emblem for the media is composed of five capital letters, PRESS, in black on a circular orange background (orange disk).
3. A journalist wearing the distinctive emblem should be able to prove his or her identity by showing his or her press card or equivalent identity document, when it is requested by an officer on duty. The right to wear this emblem for the press is exclusively reserved to journalists.
4. The distinctive emblem shall be worn in a clearly visible manner, either on an arm band on the upper left or right arm, or on a cloth covering the chest or back. Vehicles, professional equipment and media installations may also be marked with the distinctive emblem.
There are clearly two parts to the notion of a distinctive emblem for journalists. One element is that journalists who are accidentally 124 The IHFFC in a Few Words, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN FACT-FINDING COMMISSION (IHFFC), http://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=EN&page=aboutus_general (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 125 Id. Established in 1992, the IHFFC has yet to be called upon to examine an issue. 126 Draft Convention, supra note 107, at Preamble. targeted, being mistaken for persons taking direct part in hostilities, would potentially benefit from wearing a distinctive emblem visible at a distance. In such cases, much like the accidental targeting of the Reuters journalists by American troops in 2007, 127 a distinctive emblem would help identify such persons as civilian journalists; cameras and tripods would not be mistaken for rocket launchers or AK-47s. In addition, the wearing of a distinctive emblem may help in targeting decisions -the presence of a journalist in a large crowd may 'tip the balance' in favor of the presumption of a civilian designation, rather than the crowd or gathering being identified as hostile. Indeed, this is one of the stated aims of the Covenant, which asserts that the "general protection accorded to the civilian population by humanitarian law would be reinforced by a more frequent presence of journalists on the ground alongside the victims". 128 However, it is equally possible that the obvious presence of journalists in a crowd of civilians could tip the balance the other waywearing the emblem would not only make journalists more clearly identifiable (and therefore targetable), it could also make it easier to identify the people who are speaking to journalists, who may as a result be deemed to be civil resistance operatives and therefore targeted, as has occurred in some oppressive regime situations. 129 It is here that one of the complications regarding the Emblem arises. While the Emblem may serve to protect journalists from being accidently targeted, the issue of journalists who are deliberately targeted is less clear. In February 2012 veteran war journalist Marie Colvin and photographer Remi Ochlik were killed in Syria when more than 10 rockets hit the house/makeshift media centre they were staying in, in November that year, another media house in Syria was bombed and three more journalists were killed. 130 These and other similar incidents point to the deliberate targeting of journalists because of their status; thus, compelling such persons to wear identification that is highly visible may be detrimental. It is this issue, along with other potential problems regarding the Convention, which will be examined in the next section of this paper.
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH THE CAMPAIGN AND EMBLEM
While endeavours to ensure the protection of journalists in times of armed conflict are admirable, it should be assessed whether a journalists' convention -and a press emblem specifically -would actually further such endeavours. This section of the paper thus examines some of the concerns raised and problems inherent in a dedicated Press Convention, and a Press Emblem.
A. THE PERCEIVED 'GAPS' IN THE LAW
The motivation behind the introduction of a new system of special protection seems to be that, somehow, the existing law that protects journalists -the law that protect civilians -is somehow inadequate, and that journalists are in need of a special regime of protection, tailored just to them.
131
While the deliberate targeting of journalists is indeed problematic -"an ultimate, brutal, form of censorship"
132
-one has to question whether such acts are due to a failure in the law, or, more likely, down to a failure to respect the law. As UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns has noted, the most immediate problem does not lie with gaps in the international legal framework. The challenge is rather to ensure that the established international framework is fully used, and that its norms are reflected in domestic laws and practices. 133 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the origins of Article 79, and the idea of singling out journalists for special consideration, came not from discussions in the lead up to the adoption of the Additional Protocols 134 but rather from initiatives in the UN General Assembly. In 1970, France had asked the Economic and Social Council, through the General 131 See IDI Report, supra note 4 at 469. 132 Id. at 466. 133 Heyns, supra note 11, at 1. 134 See infra note 136.
Assembly, to draft a convention with regards to protecting journalists on dangerous missions. 135 Draft conventions were then submitted for consideration to the Conference of Government Experts.
136
It was eventually decided that the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions would be better dealt with in an international humanitarian law instrument, rather than an individual treaty; thus, Article 79 (stating that journalists are civilians unless they participate) was included in Protocol I.
The Preamble to the draft press covenant states, in paragraph 8, that the covenant has been drafted partially in response to the failure of States to adequately implement and enforce the provisions of Article 79 of Protocol I:
. . . experience has shown that, generally speaking, since the adoption of Protocol 1, the provisions of Article 79 are rarely respected and that the protection and that the protection they are supposed to provide is for the most part ineffective Given such a dismissal of the existing law, one has to question whether additional laws, ones that essentially reconfirm existing law, would actually fare any better. This is especially concerning when one considers some of the other provisions in the Covenant, which seem to impose onerous, if not outright unrealistic, obligations on States parties, including giving journalists "free access to information and all relevant documents and to facilitate their movements"; 137 ensuring that journalists are, "without exception" given advance warning of military attacks, 138 and that "media corridors, like those applied to humanitarian workers" However, if one accepts that the law is deficient, and that new laws would somehow fill the lacunae, is the draft press covenant sufficient to that task? Despite the good intentions of the draft covenant, there are some serious failings in the document, both from a legal and a policy perspective.
B. THE EMBLEM AS A 'BULLS-EYE'
Some journalists have rejected outright the idea of an internationally mandated press emblem, seeing a 'Press" armband as something akin to a 'bullseye', marking them out as a visible target. Regarding the emblem, Willacy summed up three concerns: firstly, the targeting issue and journalists' resistance to wearing it; secondly that, like flak jackets, special protection would make it harder to establish empathetic connections with sources and therefore harder to get stories; and thirdly the risk of emblem abuse by parties to the conflict. In his words: 142 I wouldn't wear it. In conflicts like Iraq, highlighting the fact you're a journalist was like painting a target on your forehead. While conflicts have always been messy, I think modern insurgency/uprising-styled brawls are notable for the high death-toll amongst the press -due largely to the fact we have been specifically targeted (as in, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon. . . and most recently in Syria). I just don't think there's enough uniform respect or understanding for or about what we do. We're seen by many sides as partisan combatants aligned with the ideology of one side or the other Wearing that emblem would make me feel less safe. In fact, in 4 years in the Middle East I only wore a flak jacket a handful of times 140 (usually in situations where I didn't stand out, like in the car). Wearing a flak jacket makes you stand out, can make people suspicious and limits your movement . . . Wearing this emblem would also say to our talent that we somehow should be immune from being shot, when they -civilians, mostly -tend to be the biggest victims of conflict (like the one in Syria now). It doesn't engender empathy. And who's to say one side in a conflict doesn't get a heap of PRESS badges made up in an attempt to launch a strike? The whole credibility of the scheme would be shot down instantly.
Indeed, his first concern was noted during the Diplomatic Conference leading up to the adoption of the Additional Protocols. Regarding the Article 79 provision on journalists, a proposal was forwarded to require all journalists seeking the protection of the Protocol to wear a distinctive armband, similar to the one being proposed by the Press Emblem Campaign. 143 However, as noted in the Commentary to the Protocols: 144 this proposal was rejected primarily on the basis of the following argument: by making the wearer of the armlet conspicuous to combatants, such means of identification might make the journalists' mission even more dangerous; similarly it was argued that in this way the journalists would be likely to endanger the surrounding civilian population. 145 Thus, a protective emblem for journalists might actually undermine the intentions of those promoting its adoption -by making journalists more easily identifiable at a distance. Indeed, this was noted by the IDI in 2009 who rejected the idea of a new regime of special protection for journalists: no special protection of journalists can work in practice unless armed units in the field can tell them apart from other civilians (and, of course, combatants). Hence, the crux of the issue is that a new regime of special protection of journalists is contingent on: (i) the establishment of a credible system of identification/accreditation of 143 all those entitled to enjoy the special protection, and (ii) the adoption of a distinct recognizable emblem of protection. In view of the opposition of most journalists to both the mandatory identification/accreditation and to a new emblem of protection. . . it appeared. . . unrealistic to recommend the creation of a new category of protection of journalists.
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As accounts noted in this paper suggest, journalists are now becoming a target of belligerents; as such, it is counter-intuitive to make identification of them an easier process. In addition to being targeted for reasons related to the conflict and their reporting of it, foreign journalists are also at risk of kidnap by opportunistic parties seeking ransom money. Given such practices, it would seem self-defeating to make identification of journalists an easier process.
C. POLICING THE USE OF THE EMBLEM AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF DISTINCTIVE PROTECTIVE EMBLEMS
It was argued during the Additional Protocols Diplomatic Conferences that creating an additional protective emblem for journalists to be used during times of armed conflict would contribute to 'emblem fatigue' -that to increase the number of protective emblems would "weaken the protective value of each protected status already accepted, particularly that of medical personnel. . . . [if such an emblem were adopted]. . . the efficacy of protection and the credibility of the whole system of protection would have suffered." 150 Attempts to introduce a protected journalist emblem during the 1970s were unsuccessful in part due a resistance to introduce any more international protected emblems. This was highlighted by the ICRC in their Commentary to the Additional Protocols, 151 and remains a concern today with regards to the proposed Press Emblem.
However, if a Press Emblem were to gain support internationally, additional problems are foreseeable, likely arising from the policing of such emblem 152 Under international law, the emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent are specially protected; 153 misuse of the protected emblems is a war crime, 154 and State parties to the Geneva Conventions 155 are obliged to pursue domestic criminal prosecution for people who misuse the emblem. 156 If a citizen journalist sought to protect themselves through use of the proposed press emblem, they would, potentially, be liable for misuse of an internationally protected emblem. Indeed, general problems with policing such a system of registration and identification were noted by the IDI: accreditation of 'war correspondents' is indispensable: it is, in fact, an integral part of the definition of this category of journalists. However, as far as other journalists are concerned. . . any requirement of accreditations may diminish from the protection of non-accredited journalists. . . in non-international armed conflicts, a mandatory accreditation requirement may in fact imperil journalists if they seek accreditation from the central Government (which the insurgents are rebelling against). 157 The IDI also notes the general reluctance of most journalists to seek accreditation from any Government, including their own, as well as reluctance on the part of any non-governmental organization, such as the International Federation of Journalists, to step in to act as an accrediting authority. 158 Wisconsin International Law Journal accreditation and monitoring that would be integral to the introduction of a press emblem, it seems unrealistic to thus advocate for the introduction of such an emblem.
It would seem that the draft covenant attempts to counter such concerns, by not obligating journalists to wear the emblem. As noted in Article 7:
The wearing of the distinctive emblem is optional in all circumstances. Its use is left to the free choice of the journalist and/or his or her employers. No authority may impose the wearing of the distinctive emblem. When a journalist decides not to wear this emblem, he continues to benefit from all the other provisions of this Convention However, this provision raises an additional issue: if wearing the emblem is voluntary, it seems reasonable to ask why an emblem should be adopted in the first place. If the covenant does not intend to introduce the press emblem as an internationally protected and mandated symbol, why is the specific introduction -in treaty form -of such an emblem necessary?
D. POW TREATMENT FOR JOURNALISTS
Another area of concern comes with Article 4 of the draft covenant, entitled 'Media POWs', which states that: 159 Journalists detained during an armed conflict have the right to the same treatment as that accorded to the prisoners of war (POWS) by the third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, in particular its article 4 paragraph 4 which states that war prisoners are "persons who followed the armed forces without directly taking part to them, such as (. . .) the war correspondents.
It seems curious that the covenant would want to introduce the POW schema for journalists, given the intent behind the granting of POW status is as preventative detention for persons taking active part in hostilities. POW status and detention is as a means by which combatants are removed from active hostilities and prevented from further participation in the armed conflict. As such, POWs can be detained until the cessation of active hostilities. It seems odd that the covenant would implicitly sanction detention of journalists. Arguably, administrative detention under Geneva Convention IV would be a more appropriate mechanism, as, in international armed conflict at least, it offers the same kinds of protections and rights afforded to POWs, and includes the possibility to challenge one's detention and gain release from captivity if one is deemed not to pose a threat to one's captors. This right to challenge ones detention is contained in Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV: 160 If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment. . . This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power.
Thus, the granting of POW status to journalists may be somewhat meaningless. As noted by Saul: 161 POW status is a double-edged sword for journalists. While such status carries with it various protections in detention, on the other hand it renders the POW liable to. . . detention, without charge, until the end of the conflict. Even the protections enjoyed by POWs do not confer any particular advantage upon journalists, since other civilians detained . . . for security reasons are equally entitled to fundamental protections under humanitarian law and human rights law.
E. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESS COVENANT DEFINITION OF JOURNALIST
In addition to concerns regarding the efficacy of an emblem in enhancing the safety of journalists, the definition of 'journalist' under the proposed covenant also raises questions, from a policy perspective. The covenant sets out an expansive list of persons who would be covered by its provisions. 162 However, the definition does not adequately address the emerging phenomenon of 'citizen journalism', a term used to describe:
. . .a range of web-based practices whereby 'ordinary' users engage in journalistic practices. Citizen journalism includes practices such as current affairs-based blogging, photo and video sharing, and posting eyewitness commentary on current events. Sometimes the term is 160 See GCIV, supra note 6, at art. 78. 161 Saul, supra note 140, at 104. 162 Draft Convention, supra note 107, at Preamble para. 25.
used quite broadly to include activities such as re-posting, linking, 'tagging' (labeling with keywords), rating, modifying or commenting upon news materials posted by others users or by professional news outlets, whereby citizens participate in the news process without necessarily acting as 'content creators'. 163 A more succinct definition offered Jay Rosen and, before him, Dan Gillmor, notes "when the people formerly known as the audience employ the press tools they have in their possession to inform one another, that's citizen journalism." 164 For the purposes of this paper, it is only necessary to consider those instances where civilians are involved in 'content creation'; where civilians report directly on events they are witnessing or have witnessed such as when Iranian protestors took to Twitter to report on protests against the Ahmadinejad regime following reputedly corrupt election results: 165 On June 13, when protests started to escalate, and the Iranian government moved to suppress dissent both on-and off-line, the Twitterverse exploded with tweets from people who weren't having it, both in English and in Farsi. While the front pages of Iranian newspapers were full of blank space where censors had whited-out news stories, Twitter was delivering information from street level, in real time.
Such examples of citizen journalism arguably do not sit easily with the definitions outlined in the draft covenant. People who do not 'work' as journalists, in the sense of it being their profession, but who still might find themselves in a unique position to report on current events -especially in a war zone -would likely find themselves excluded from the protections of the draft covenant. The use of the word 'work' in the covenant also leaves room for debate about whether it would cover unsalaried journalists, such as freelancers and stringers, who are paid after publication and can't guarantee at the point of newsgathering whether their piece will be published in a commercial news outlet or elsewhere online on a blog or via social media without payment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Whether we get our information from newspapers, television, the internet, or Twitter, whether that information comes from a professional journalist or from a bystander capturing footage on their smart phone, or tweeting 140 characters, we rely on intercessors to communicate information to us, which helps us make informed decisions about our world and our governmental, economic, and societal structures. That journalists serve an important function -one that can frequently put them in dangerous situations -is recognized in international law, and journalists are specifically acknowledged and protected under the laws of armed conflict. However, some have argued that such protections need to be expanded, due to the fact that journalists are frequently subject to violence, either unintentionally or deliberately, especially during times of armed conflict.
However, the fact that journalists are subject to such violence is a result of a failure to observe the law, rather than a failure of the law itself. The laws of armed conflict comprise comprehensive rules regarding the protection of journalists as civilians and war correspondents as civilians and POWs. While attempts by journalism organizations to remind the international community of the importance of protecting journalists are admirable, the introduction of a new treaty would arguably not change the current situation.
The Press Emblem Campaign could undermine efforts for the implementation and respect of existing IHL provisions. 166 The value of the existing laws should not be underestimated as there is widespread international support, both amongst States parties to the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols and the Rome Statute, and in the practice of States that have included Article 79 in their laws of Armed Combat.
Promotion of these existing laws may well be more constructive than calling for a new treaty, given that some of the articles in the Draft Convention render it unlikely to garner many national signatories. For example, Article 9 requires State Parties to establish "a compensation fund with substantial financial resources" and Article 3.3 states: "Any State, whether party or not to an armed conflict, has the obligation to assist journalists in the line of duty giving them free access to information and all relevant documents and to facilitate their movements." These provisions may well prove to be onerous obligations that States may not wish to adopt.
People who find themselves in proximity to armed conflicts will always be vulnerable to violence; administrations, regimes and groups that deliberately target journalists will arguably not be deterred by a new treaty that affirms that journalists, like all civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, should not be made the object of attack. Therefore, energies would be better spent promoting more thorough understanding of the existing laws through media campaigns to support their enforcement, giving more coverage to IHL breaches, and better training for journalists in IHL and ICC processes.
